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COMMERCIAL APPROPRIATION OF A PERSON'S IMAGE: WELLS V ATOLL 








Our modern society has become transfixed with celebrity. The mass media lap up 
every sordid little snippet of news about actors, music stars, sport stars, politicians, 
royals, socialites and other famous people and sell it to consumers who eagerly 
await the next celebrity scandal. Business people and marketers also endeavour to 
cash in on the popularity enjoyed by the stars and realise the value of associating 
merchandise or trademarks with the rich and famous. 
 
This leads to difficulties when the attributes of a person are apparently used without 
consent, which poses new questions to the law: should the law protect the individual 
against unlawful use of his or her image? If so, to what extent should such protection 
be granted? These were some of the questions which the court had to answer in 




The plaintiff, as legal guardian of her minor daughter, launched an application 
against the defendants, as owner/publisher and as editor of a surfing magazine 
ZigZag, for a claim of damages arising out of the publication of a photograph of her 
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daughter and causing the offending photograph to be displayed on national 
television. 
 
The photograph was presumably taken while the plaintiff and her family were on 
vacation in Cape St Francis and published in the April 2006 edition of the magazine, 
without the plaintiff's knowledge, authority or consent. The girl was 12 years old at 
the time the photograph was presumably taken. It appeared in a section of the 
magazine entitled "dishing up the photo feast" and, as it was published, was 
stamped bearing the word "filth" as well as a caption at the foot of the photograph 
reading "all-natural Eastern Cape honey". The cover of the magazine proclaimed 
"100% pure filth photos inside". The photograph was also screened as part of an 
advertisement on national television. 
 
Although the photograph was taken from behind and the girl's face was obscured by 
the angle at which it was taken as well as by her hair, many people apparently 
recognised the girl in the photograph. A consequence of this was that disparaging 
remarks were made about the girl in mobile text messages, as well as electronic 
chat-rooms and communities, where she was called a "slut" and "PE's little porn 
star". The girl was also distressed to learn that the picture had been put up as a pin-





The plaintiff based her case primarily on two issues: firstly, the publication of the 
words "Pure Filth" in conjunction with the photograph was defamatory and secondly, 
the publication of the photograph without consent amounted to an invasion of the 
girl's privacy. As a result, the court had to determine whether the girl could be 
recognised by reasonable readers of the magazine, whether the language used in 
conjunction with the photograph was defamatory and whether the girl's dignity and 
rights to privacy had been infringed. 
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Davis J concluded that the girl could be identified and that publication of the 
photograph and the accompanying words were indeed defamatory. He held that 
publication of the photo concerned was not reasonable as 
 
[t]he manner in which the photograph was published without any regard to the 
context or implications for a twelve year old girl … does not, in my view, satisfy the 
test of reasonable publication … . 
 
Davis J found support for his conclusion in section 28(2) of the Constitution, which 
provides that a child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child. He found that publication of the photograph without any attempt 
to obtain consent and with the clear purpose of including it to increase the attraction 
of a commercial publication was not in the best interest of the girl and constituted a 
failure of the standard of the reasonable publisher in the position of the defendants. 
 
On the questions pertaining to the invasion of privacy and the infringement of dignity 
raised by the plaintiff, he added that 
 
[i]n Grütter v Lombard and another 2007 (4) SA 89 (SCA), at para 8 Nugent JA, in a 
most carefully researched judgment, noted that it was generally accepted academic 
opinion that features of a personal identity are capable and indeed deserving of legal 
protection. In the context of this case, therefore, the appropriation of a person's 
image or likeness for the commercial benefit or advantage of another may well call 
for legal intervention in order to protect the individual concerned. That may not apply 
to the kinds of photographs or television images of crowd scenes which contain 
images of individuals therein. However, when the photograph is employed, as in this 
case, for the benefit of a magazine sold to make profit, it constitutes an unjustifiable 
invasion of the personal [sic] rights of the individual, including the person's dignity 
and privacy. In this dispute, no care was exercised in respecting these core rights. 
 
 
In the context of this case, therefore, the appropriation of a person's image or 
likeness for the commercial benefit or advantage of another may well call for legal 
intervention in order to protect the individual concerned. That may not apply to the 
kinds of photographs or television images of crowd scenes which contain images of 
individuals therein. However, when the photograph is employed, as in this case, for 
the benefit of a magazine sold to make profit, it constitutes an unjustifiable invasion 
of the personal [sic] rights of the individual, including the person's dignity and 
privacy. In this dispute, no care was exercised in respecting these core rights. 
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As a result, on this ground as well, Davis J ruled in favour of the plaintiff. However, 
he did not base this aspect of his judgment on the invasion of privacy and the 
reliance on Grütter2 is significant here. In the context of this case, it means that the 
way the photograph was published constituted both defamation and an unlawful 
appropriation of the girl's image. It was this unlawful appropriation which resulted in 




This case is of little significance in so far as it relates to the common law of 
defamation. However, the restatement of the law laid down in Grütter v Lombard3 in 
respect of the appropriation of an image is of much significance. Of particular interest 
is Davis J's apparent conclusion that appropriation of a person's image constitutes 
an unjustifiable invasion of the personality rights of the individual, where a 
photograph is published for the benefit of a magazine sold to make profit. It invites 
the question if all magazines and newspapers are not sold for profit and if every 
photograph published in newspapers and magazines is not published "with the clear 
purpose of including it to increase the attraction of a commercial publication".4 It also 
seems to suggest that the media may not display or publish a photograph depicting 
an individual subject unless that subject has consented to such display or 
publication. 
 
If this is indeed how Davis J interpreted the law, the interpretation holds far-reaching 
implications for the media. The possibility of such an interpretation demands a 
deeper analysis of the law in so far as it relates to the unauthorised use of a person's 
image. Such an analysis requires some understanding of the historical foundations 
of the law in this regard, as well as some reflection on the law in other jurisdictions to 
determine if they can assist in making sense of this judgment. In particular, since this 
case raises the issue of privacy in the context of the unauthorised use of a person's 
image, it may be worthwhile to pay particular attention to Dutch law and the laws in 
                                                 
2 Grütter v Lombard 2007 4 SA 89 (SCA). 
3 Grütter v Lombard 2007 4 SA 89 (SCA). 
4 Grütter v Lombard 2007 4 SA 89 (SCA): Davis J at para 45. 
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various jurisdictions in the United States of America. As I will illustrate below, in 
Dutch law and the laws in many of the US states, the infringement of a person's right 
to identity invariably raises issues of privacy. 
 
5 Historical development 
 
Ancient legal systems already recognised certain personality rights, but were 
generally concerned with protection of individuals against physical assaults only. For 
instance, the Twelve Tables of early Roman law provided for a variety of physical 
impairments for which predetermined compensation could be claimed in delict.5 
These principles would eventually form the basis on which the actio iniuriarum would 
develop during the Roman Republic.6 During this period, the focus in the Roman law 
of personality rights shifted from physical assault to contumelia or insult as the basis 
for unlawfulness.7 Eventually Roman law reached the stage where any insult through 
word, act or conduct could be actionable. The form of the insult ranged from physical 
assault to cases of insult where no physical attack took place.8 Eventually, it was 
decreed that 
 
[t]he Praetor outlaws that which could lead to insult for another. So whatever one 
does or says to embarrass someone else that gives rise to the actio iniuriarum.9 
 
Roman law consequently reached the stage where a variety of personality rights was 
recognised and any infringement of a person's body, honour or dignity could in 
principle found a claim with the actio iniuriarum.10 And, more significantly from a 
modern perspective, the scope of the actio iniuriarum could be extended on the 
strength of the general boni mores test to cover situations not previously envisaged 
under that remedy.11 However, it seems that in Roman law the unauthorised use of 
another person's name or image was actionable only if such use would also amount 
                                                 
5 Tab VIII.1 - 4. See also Zimmermann Obligations 1050 et seq. 
6 Zimmermann Obligations 1050. 
7 Borkowski Roman Law 348; Van Zyl History 343; Neethling Persoonlikheidsreg 51. 
8 D 47.10.1.1 et seq. 
9 D 47.10.15.27. Own translation. The original text reads: Generaliter vetuit Praetor quid ad 
infamiam alicuius fieri. Proinde quodcumque quis fecerit vel dixerit, ut alium infamet, erit actio 
iniuriarum. 
10 D 47.10.1.2. 
11 Neethling Persoonlikheidsreg 55. 
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to an insult, as when someone wrote, published or performed a poem or song that 
ridiculed someone else.12 For some time it seemed that our modern law would follow 
suit. In Kidson v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd,13 a photo of three nurses appeared 
next to a newspaper article in which the headline and introductory text stated that 
lonely nurses were looking for boyfriends to provide (probably more than) company. 
Here the court steadfastly held on to the requirement of insult, with the result that two 
of the plaintiffs failed with their claims. One of the plaintiffs succeeded on the 
grounds that she was married and therefore apparently insulted by the insinuation 
that she was potentially unfaithful. The courts in Grütter14 and Wells15 have, 
however, now established that our modern law has moved beyond the requirement 
of insult in this kind of case. 
 
The actio iniuriarum was also received into medieval European legal systems.16 
Voet17 explains that iniuria consisted of any infringement of a person's good name or 
reputation. It could be committed through acts, words, writings or collusion with 
another. But it seems that insult was still a requirement if someone wished to 
succeed with a claim for the unauthorised use of his image.18 The focus was solely 
on privacy and dignity, rather than a concern with unfair appropriation of economic 
value derived from the image of another. From these concepts the modern concepts 
of privacy and dignity developed in the private or civil law of many modern legal 
systems.19 From there only a small adjustment in focus was required to deal with 
commercial exploitation of an individual's image. 
 
On the other hand, in early English law, royal justice was a favour which had to be 
specifically granted by the King. A party who wished to originate a suit in the King's 
courts consequently first had to obtain a royal writ from the King's Chancery to 
                                                 
12 D 47.10.15.27. 
13 Kidson v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd 1957 3 SA 461 (W). 
14 Grütter v Lombard 2007 4 SA 89 (SCA). 
15 Wells v Atoll Media (Pty) Ltd (unreported 11961/2006) [2009] ZAWCHC 173 (9 November 2009). 
16 Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 47.10.7; Pothier Traité des Obligations 116, 118; Lessius De 
Iustitia et Iure, Ceterisque Virtutibus Cardinalis Libri Quatuor 2.7.5.19; Durandus Speculum Iuris 
4.4.2.15; Ubaldi Commentaria Corpus Iuris Civilis 9.2.41. 
17 Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 47.10.7. 
18 Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 47.10.7. 
19 Zimmermann Obligations 1050 et seq. 
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authorise commencement with the action.20 As a result, early English law followed a 
procedural approach as opposed to the principles-based approach that was followed 
in other European systems. 
 
Where one person suffered a wrong at the hands of another, this was in certain 
cases seen as a disturbance of the King's peace and the wronged party could obtain 
the writ of trespass. Initially, three kinds of trespass were recognised: battery or 
assault, taking goods, and entering land or a house.21 Trespass was soon modified 
to extend its scope to various other wrongs.22 The effect of this was that different 
writs or actions were developed for different wrongs.23 The Anglo-American law of 
torts in the modern sense developed from this in the nineteenth century.24 
 
Towards the end of the eighteenth century in the United States of America, the 
Fourth Amendment, which dealt with unreasonable searches and seizures, 
introduced the concept of personal sovereignty.25 This in turn gave rise to the 
systematic protection of domestic privacy in various state courts and the imposition 
of penalties for criminal trespass, which in turn gave rise to civil remedies against 
intrusions by strangers.26 In 1880 this process gained substantial momentum with 
the publication of an article in which Warren and Brandeis27 sought to extract a right 
of privacy from the protection afforded by common law copyright, on the grounds that 
the protection afforded to the expression of thoughts merely amounted to 
enforcement of the more general right of each individual to be left alone.28 The right 
to privacy at common law was first recognised by the Supreme Court of Georgia in 
Pavesich v New England Life Insurance Co29 and this provided the impetus for courts 
                                                 
20 Jenks History 47. 
21 Reeves History 84 et seq. 
22 Reeves History 88 et seq. 
23 Lunny and Oliphant Tort 2. 
24 Burdick Torts 1. 
25 Originally the Fourth Amendment restricted the power of only the Federal Government, until the 
US Supreme Court ruled in Mapp v Ohio 367 US 643 that it was also applicable to state 
governments. 
26 Glenn Privacy 47 et seq. 
27 Warren and Brandeis 1890 HLR 193. 
28 Beverley-Smith Personality 146 et seq. 
29 Pavesich v New England Life Insurance Co 50 SE 68. 
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in other states to follow suit.30 Significantly, many of the early cases on the right to 
privacy in the United States dealt with the unauthorised taking or publication of 
photographs depicting the aggrieved parties. This provided the logical basis, then, 
for the eventual protection of identity in various US states today. 
 
6 Comparative analysis 
 
Most legal systems today recognise identity as a personality interest which deserves 
protection. The level of protection, however, differs substantially from one jurisdiction 
to the next. 
 
Dutch law provides elaborate protection against unauthorised use of an individual's 
image. The Auteurswet protects the individual against unauthorised publication of his 
or her portrait. The explanatory memorandum to the Auteurswet explains that the 
concept "portrait" can be defined as any depiction of a person's face with or without 
any other parts of the body, irrespective of how the depiction was made. Section 21 
of the Auteurswet provides that publication of the portrait is not authorised if the 
subject or, after demise of the subject, one of his or her surviving dependants has a 
reasonable interest in opposing publication. 
 
The requisite interest can take one of two forms. Firstly, there is the interest in 
privacy. A subject can oppose publication of a portrait if the subject can show that 
such publication will infringe on his or her right to privacy. By the nature of things, 
famous people such as politicians and film and sport stars must endure invasion of 
privacy to a greater extent than others, but there are limits, and when the limits are 
exceeded this excess can form the basis for a claim. Therefore, when a magazine 
stated on the cover that a football player had a homosexual relationship with a singer 
but the article in the magazine declared the opposite, it was held that there had been 
a breach of the football player's privacy.31 
                                                 
30 See eg. Smith v Suratt 1926 WL 1024 (Alaska); Mabry v Kettering 117 SW 746 (Arkansas); 
Thayer v Worcester Post Co 187 NE 292 (Massachusetts); Vassar College v Loose-Wiles Biscuit 
Co 197 F 982 (Missouri); Flake v Greensboro News Co 195 SE 55 (North Carolina); Harlow v 
Buno Co 36 Pa D&C 101 (Pennsylvania). 
31 Vondelpark 1988 NJ 1000. 
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Secondly, there is a commercial interest. Dutch law recognises the fact that the 
image of a famous person has become a commodity.32 In the 't Schaep met de Vijf 
Pooten case,33 the Hooge Raad laid down two requirements before an individual 
could claim a commercial interest. Firstly, the individual concerned must already 
have obtained some fame from practising his or her profession. The concept 
"profession" is interpreted broadly, so that even amateur sports people, who do not 
strictly speaking practise sport as their profession, are included here if they have 
gained some fame from participation in their sports.34 Secondly, there must be a 
commercial exploitation of such fame. This aspect was clearly explained in the De 
slag om het voetbalgoud case.35 A book, entitled De slag om het voetbalgoud, filled 
with photographs of the players in the Dutch football team which played in the final of 
the 1974 World Cup tournament, was published. This in itself did not violate any of 
the players' rights as it merely amounted to a factual report on a contemporary 
matter of public interest. However, the publishers sold the entire print run of the book 
to a company which used the book as part of its marketing campaign. The 
Rechtbank Haarlem held that this latter aspect amounted to commercial exploitation, 
with the result that it infringed on the players' portrait rights. 
 
In the United States of America, various states protect identity under the broader 
concept of privacy. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York laid the 
foundation in Haelan Laboratories Inc v Topps Chewing Gum.36 The appellant 
contracted with various baseball players for the exclusive right to use their images in 
the marketing of the appellant's chewing gum. The respondent did the same in the 
marketing of its chewing gum, but did not obtain the consent of the players 
concerned. The court held that, apart from the statutory right to privacy in the New 
York Civil Rights Law, a right to publicity could also be derived from the common law 
of New York. 
 
                                                 
32 Teddy Scholten 1961 NJ 160. 
33 ‘t Schaep met de Vijf Pooten 1979 NJ 383. 
34 Arnold Vanderlijde 1994 NJ 658. 
35 De slag om het voetbalgoud 1974 NJ 415. 
36 Haelan Laboratories Inc v Topps Chewing Gum 202 F 2d 866. 
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals eventually held in Pirone v MacMillan37 that the 
court had erred in Haelan Laboratories38 since the right to identity was recognised 
only by statute in the New York Civil Rights Law and that there was no 
distinguishable common law right to identity in New York.39 By this time, however, 
Haelan Laboratories40 had already served repeatedly as authority and led to the 
recognition of a common law right to publicity in more than thirty of the US states.41 
                                                 
37 Pirone v MacMillan 894 F 2d 579. 
38 Haelan Laboratories Inc v Topps Chewing Gum 202 F 2d 866. 
39 See also Chimarev v TD Waterhouse Investor Services Inc 280 F Supp 2d 208; Myskina v 
Conde Nast Publications Inc 386 F Supp 2d 409; Messenger ex rel Messenger v Gruner Jahr 
Printing and Publishing 94 NY 2d 436; Freihofer v Hearst Corporation 65 NY 2d 135; Novel v 
Beacon Operating Corporation 446 NYS 2d 118; In re Dora P 418 NYS 2d 59; and Kiss v County 
of Putnam 398 NYS 2d 729. 
40 Haelan Laboratories Inc v Topps Chewing Gum 202 F 2d 866. 
41 See for instance Allison v Vintage Sports Plaques 136 F 3d 1443 in Alabama (the framing and 
resale of collectors' cards depicting sports stars are unlawful); Olan Mills Inc v Dodd 353 SW 2d 
22 in Arkansas (the use of a person's image in an advertising brochure without consent is 
unlawful); Venturi v Savitt Inc 468 A 2d 933 in Connecticut (a claim by a golf player for the 
unauthorised use of his photograph in an advertisement fails because the plaintiff could not 
prove intent to cause harm); Vassiliades v Garfinckel's Brooks Bros 492 A 2d 580 in the District 
of Columbia (a plastic surgeon and publisher who published "before" and "after" pictures of 
patients violated the privacy of the patients, whether they were famous or not); Martin Luther 
King Jr Center for Social Change Inc v American Heritage Products Inc 296 SE 2d 697 in 
Georgia (the court prohibits the unauthorised sale of statuettes made to the image of King); 
Fergerstrom v Hawaiian Ocean View Estates Inc 441 P 2d 808 in Hawaii (a property developer 
may not use pictures of the purchaser and construction of a house in an advertising brochure 
without consent); Johnson v Boeing Airplane Co 262 P 2d 808 in Kansas (an employee who 
tacitly agreed to have a photograph taken next to an aircraft and for the photograph to be used in 
an advertising brochure forfeits a claim against the employer); Prudhomme v Proctor and 
Gamble Co 800 F Supp 390 in Louisiana (advertising showing an impersonator of a famous chef 
violates the privacy of the chef); Lawrence v AS Abell Co 475 A 2d 448 in Maryland (the use of 
newspaper clippings with pictures of babies in advertising for a newspaper does not violate the 
privacy of the mothers or the babies); Carson v Here's Johnny Portable Toilets Inc 698 F 2d 831 
in Michigan (the unauthorised use of a famous person's name is unlawful if that person can be 
identified); Candebat v Flanagan 487 S 2d 207 in Mississippi (a reference to a particular person's 
motor vehicle collision without consent in advertising is unlawful); Haith v Model Cities Health 
Corp 704 SW 2d 684 in Missouri (an employer may not use the names of medical practitioners 
whom it employs in advertising without their consent); Gilham v Burlington Northern Inc 514 F 2d 
660 in New Jersey (where a company owns the copyright in a picture of an individual that 
company may consent to the use of that picture on the cover of a magazine); Benally v Hundred 
Arrows Press Inc 614 F Supp 969 in New Mexico (the publication of a photograph showing 
Navajo natives in a book on the life and work of a photographer is not unlawful); Reeves v United 
Artists Corp 765 F 2d 79 in Ohio (the right to publicity is not heritable and lapsed on the death of 
a famous boxer); Martinez v Democrat-Herald Publishing Co 669 P 2d 818 in Oregon (a picture 
of a student with a history of drug abuse in an article on drug use on campus does not violate the 
rights of the student); Gee v CBS Inc 612 F 2d 572 in Pennsylvania (where a record company 
owns the copyright in a musical performance it may use the name and image of the singer on the 
record cover); Staruski v Continental Telephone Co 581 A 2d 266 in Vermont (an employer may 
not use a picture of an employee in advertising without consent); Crump v Beckley Newspapers 
Inc 320 SE 2d 70 in West Virginia (a picture of a female coal miner in an article on women in coal 
mines is not unlawful). 
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In Allison v Vintage Sports Plaques,42 Kravitch J of the federal appeals court for the 
Eleventh Circuit summarised the common law position succinctly.43 She explained 
that in Alabama, as in various other jurisdictions in the United States, the right to the 
use of a person's image is protected under the tort of invasion of privacy. This tort 
can be committed in any one of four ways. Firstly privacy is violated through access 
to the plaintiff's physical and intimate secludedness, secondly through publication in 
conflict with generally accepted norms of decency, thirdly through publication which 
places the plaintiff in a false light, and fourthly through unauthorised use of the 
plaintiff's image for commercial gain. The third category is also known as the "tort of 
false light publicity", while the fourth category is also known as the "tort of 
commercial appropriation". 
 
The basis for the protection of the right to identity in terms of these measures is the 
financial interest of the individual and not merely human dignity, as one would expect 
with the invasion of privacy. To succeed with a claim under commercial 
appropriation, the plaintiff must prove that the respondent used the plaintiff's identity, 
that the purpose of the use of the plaintiff's identity is commercial or other gain for 
the respondent, that the plaintiff's image was used without consent and that the 
plaintiff will suffer loss or prejudice as a result. In this regard, a court would look at 
the commercial damage to the business value of the human identity or the extent to 
which the plaintiff is deprived if he or she does not receive money for authorising the 
use of his or her image. 
 
Some jurisdictions in the United States of America follow a twofold approach where 
both statutory and common law measures are applied to provide extensive 
protection against the unauthorised use of an individual's image.44 In California 
                                                 
42 Allison v Vintage Sports Plaques 136 F 3d 1443. 
43 Under US law, when a federal court is deciding a common law issue, it is bound to follow the 
specific decisions of the state supreme court for the state whose common law applies. Thus, the 
federal court in Allison was predicting how the Alabama Supreme Court would define the scope 
of the tort of invasion of privacy. 
44 The mixed approach is followed in California (compare s 3344 of the Civil Code and Michaels v 
Internet Entertainment Group Inc 5 F Supp 2d 823); Florida (compare S 540.08 of the Florida 
Statutes and Zim v Western Publishing Co 573 F 2d 1318); Illinois (compare the Illinois Right of 
Publicity Act and Douglas v Hustler Magazine Inc 769 F2d 1128); Kentucky (compare S 391.170 
of the Kentucky Statutes and Foster-Milburn Co v Chinn 120 SW 364); Nebraska (compare S 20-
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section 3344 of the Civil Code provides that it is unlawful for one person to use the 
name, voice, autograph, photo or likeness of someone else for purposes of 
advertising, trade, or solicitation of customers or clients, without consent. An injured 
party may, in terms of this provision, cumulatively claim damages consisting of the 
profit which the wrongdoer gained from the use of the person's image, as well as 
punitive damages.45 The protection is not limited to famous people, but is at the 
disposal of anyone whose image is used without consent.46 Section 1449 of the 
Oklahoma Statutes contains essentially the same provision. 
 
Apart from the extensive statutory provisions to protect the individual against 
unauthorised use of his or her image, common law protection is also recognised in 
California47 and Oklahoma.48 In Porten v University of San Francisco49 the court 
explained that the right to identity can also be protected by means of the tort of 
invasion of privacy. This tort can be committed in one of four ways. Firstly, privacy is 
breached through violation of the plaintiff's physical and intimate seclusion, secondly 
                                                                                                                                                        
202 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes and Carson v National Bank of Commerce 501 F 2d 
1082); Nevada (compare S 597-770 et seq of the Nevada Revised Statutes and People for the 
Ethical Treatment of Animals v Berosini Ltd 895 P 2d 1269); Oklahoma (compare S 1449 of the 
Oklahoma Statutes and McCormack v Oklahoma Publishing Co 613 P 2d 98); Tennessee 
(compare S 47-25-1101 et seq of the Tennessee Code and Elvis Presley International Memorial 
Fund v Crowell 733 SW 2d 89); Texas (compare S 26.001 et seq of the Texas Property Code 
and National Bank of Commerce v Shaklee Corp 503 F Supp 533); Utah (compare S 76-9-407 of 
the Utah Code and Cox v Hatch 761 P 2d 556); Wisconsin (compare S 895.50 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes and Hirsch v SC Johnson and Sons Inc 280 NW 2d 129). Although the exact formulation 
of the various provisions differs from one state to the next, the underlying principles are 
essentially the same. As a result, I refer to a few examples only. 
45 Subdivision (a) provides: (a) Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, 
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for 
purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or 
services, without such person's prior consent, or, in the case of a minor, the prior consent of his 
parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons 
injured as a result thereof. In addition, in any action brought under this section, the person who 
violated the section shall be liable to the injured party or parties in an amount equal to the greater 
of seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) or the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of 
the unauthorised use, and any profits from the unauthorised use that are attributable to the use 
and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages. In establishing such profits, the 
injured party or parties are required to present proof only of the gross revenue attributable to 
such use, and the person who violated this section is required to prove his or her deductible 
expenses. Punitive damages may also be awarded to the injured party or parties. The prevailing 
party in any action under this section shall also be entitled to attorney's fees and costs. 
46 KNB Enterprises v Matthews 78 Cal App 4th 362. 
47 Michaels v Internet Entertainment Group Inc 5 F Supp 2d 823; Abdul-Jabbar v General Motors 
Corp 75 F 3d 1391. 
48 McCormack v Oklahoma Publishing Co 613 P 2d 98. 
49 Porten v University of San Francisco 64 Cal App 3d 825. 
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through publication contrary to generally accepted norms of decency, thirdly through 
publication which places the plaintiff in a false light and fourthly, by using the image 
of the plaintiff for commercial gain without consent. 
 
7 South African law 
 
In South Africa the common law approach has thus far been followed where the 
attributes of a person have been used without consent for commercial purposes. 
After some uncertainty, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Grütter v Lombard50 at last 
recognised an image as an aspect of personality which demands protection, and this 
has now been confirmed by the Western Cape High Court in Wells v Atoll Media 
(Pty) Ltd.51  
 
In Grütter52 the Supreme Court of Appeal had to decide if the name of the appellant 
could still be used in the name of a law firm even though his relationship with the firm 
had come to an end. The appellant did not claim any exclusive right to use the name, 
nor did he allege that the respondents made themselves guilty of passing off. The 
appellant merely made the case that it was well-known that he was one of the 
persons to whom the name referred and that he no longer wished to be associated 
with the firm now that his relationship with them had ceased. 
 
In a unanimous judgment, Nugent JA held that privacy is merely one of a variety of 
interests that enjoy recognition in the concept of personality rights in the context of 
the actio iniuriarum. The interest which a person has to protect his or her identity 
against exploitation cannot be distinguished therefrom and is similarly encompassed 
by that variety of personality rights which is worthy of protection. 
 
Nugent JA further referred to Neethling53 who explains that 
 
                                                 
50 Grütter v Lombard 2007 4 SA 89 (SCA). 
51 Wells v Atoll Media (Pty) Ltd (unreported 11961/2006) [2009] ZAWCHC 173 (9 November 2009). 
52 Grütter v Lombard 2007 4 SA 89 (SCA). 
53 Neethling Persoonlikheidsreg 44 et seq. 
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[i]dentity is that uniqueness which identifies each person as a particular individual 
and as such distinguishes him from others. Identity manifests itself in various indicia 
by which the person involved can be recognised: that is, facets of his personality 
which are distinctive or peculiar to him, such as his life history, his character, his 
name, his creditworthiness, his voice, his handwriting, his outward shape, etcetera. 
A person has a definitive interest that the unique nature of his being and conduct 
must be respected by outsiders. Similarly, identity is infringed upon if indicia thereof 
is used without consent in a way which is not compatible with the image of the right 
holder. 
 
On the basis of these principles, Nugent JA ruled that the appellant was entitled to 
insist that there should be no potential for error and ordered the respondents to 
desist from using his name and rectify the matter within a period of 30 days. 
 
Neethling54 is apparently of the opinion that the right to identity is infringed only if the 
attributes of a person are used without consent in a way which cannot be reconciled 
with the actual image of the individual concerned. To succeed with a claim where the 
attributes of a person are used without permission, it therefore seems to be a 
requirement that the person concerned should indicate that there was some 
misrepresentation of his or her personality. In this regard, it may be sufficient if the 
unauthorised use of a person's attributes could create the impression that the person 
concerned consented to such use or has been compensated for such use. 
 
This approach is also followed in Grütter,55 but there is also a second seminal 
principle intertwined in the judgment of Nugent JA which concerns the unjustified use 
of an individual's image for commercial gain. Nugent JA indicated that the interest of 
a person in protecting his or her image from commercial exploitation cannot 
qualitatively be distinguished from and is equally encompassed by the variety of 
personality rights which are protected under the concept of dignity.56 He further 
indicated that in casu that there was no justification for the respondents to use the 
appellant's name for their own commercial benefit.57 This would then mean that the 
right to identity can in this context be violated in one of two ways. 
                                                 
54 Neethling Persoonlikheidsreg 308 et seq. 
55 Grütter v Lombard 2007 4 SA 89 (SCA). 
56 Grütter v Lombard 2007 4 SA 89 (SCA) 95D: "The interest that a person has in preserving his or 
her identity against unauthorised exploitation seems to me to be qualitatively indistinguishable 
and equally encompassed by that protectable 'variety of personal rights'". 
57 Grütter v Lombard 2007 4 SA 89 (SCA) 96B: "... I can see no such considerations that justify the 
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Firstly, a person's right to identity is violated when the attributes of that person are 
used without permission in a way which cannot be reconciled with the true image of 
that person. Apart from the unauthorised use of a person's image, this kind of 
infringement also entails some kind of misrepresentation concerning the individual, 
such as that the individual approves of or endorses a particular product or service or 
that an attorney is a partner in a firm, while this is not the case. The unlawfulness in 
this kind of case is found in the misrepresentation concerning the individual and, 
consequently, in the violation of the right to human dignity. 
 
Secondly, the right to identity is violated if the attributes of a person are used for 
commercial gain without authorisation by another person. Apart from the 
unauthorised use of the individual's image, such a use also primarily entails a 
commercial motive, which is exclusively aimed at promoting a service or product or 
to solicit clients or customers. The unlawfulness in this case is found mainly in the 
infringement of the right to freedom of association and the commercial exploitation of 
the individual. 
 
This is not stated explicitly in Grütter,58 but can be deduced from a careful analysis of 
the judgment. The significance of the judgment by Davis J in Wells59 is that this 
interpretation of the judgment in Grütter60 has now received judicial confirmation. 
Davis J clearly interpreted the judgment in Grütter61 as holding that the appropriation 
of a person's image or likeness for the commercial benefit or advantage of another 
calls for legal intervention in order to protect the individual concerned. 
 
Thirdly, the judgment in Wells v Atoll Media (Pty) Ltd62 highlights an important aspect 
of the law of personality to which the court in Grütter63 also referred, and that is the 
                                                                                                                                                        
unauthorised use by the respondents of Grütter's name for their own commercial advantage". 
58 Grütter v Lombard 2007 4 SA 89 (SCA). 
59 Wells v Atoll Media (Pty) Ltd (unreported 11961/2006) [2009] ZAWCHC 173 (9 November 2009). 
60 Grütter v Lombard 2007 4 SA 89 (SCA). See Cornelius 2008 TSAR; Cornelius 2008 ISLRP. 
61 Grütter v Lombard 2007 4 SA 89 (SCA). 
62 Wells v Atoll Media (Pty) Ltd (unreported 11961/2006) [2009] ZAWCHC 173 (9 November 2009). 
63 Grütter v Lombard 2007 4 SA 89 (SCA). 
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interrelation between the various manifestations of personality rights. Wells64 
simultaneously involved the right to a good name, the right to privacy and the right to 
identity. I have previously criticised the approach in various jurisdictions in the United 
States, which views the unauthorised use of a person's image as a violation of the 
right to privacy, as jurisprudentially less sound than an approach which bases the 
unauthorised use of a person's image on the infringement of dignitas.65 Privacy in 
this context is usually violated through access to a person's physical and intimate 
secludedness, or through publication in conflict with generally accepted norms of 
decency.66 The criticism was based on the argument that the unauthorised use of a 
person's image would generally not involve either of these aspects. 
 
However, Wells v Atoll Media (Pty) Ltd67 has clearly illustrated how the unauthorised 
use of a person's image could also negatively impact on that person's privacy. In the 
first instance, no matter how one looks at the matter, the publication of a provocative 
photograph of a twelve-year-old girl simply cannot be reconciled with generally 
accepted norms of decency. It would be hard to reconcile it, even if the girl and her 
parents or guardian had consented to such use. Without consent, such publication 
should simply not be tolerated. Secondly, the publication of the photograph exposed 
the girl to disparaging mobile text messages sent to her telephone. This latter fact 
clearly illustrates how the unauthorised use of an image can also draw unwelcome 
attention and affect the private life of the individual concerned. As a result, the 
criticism of the American approach may be unfounded. 
 
But what is the implication of all of this for media freedom? With any action for the 
infringement of a subjective right, a variety of conflicting interests must be weighed 
against one another. With the use of a person's image, the rights to identity, human 
dignity and freedom of association of the individual must often be weighed against 
the user's right to the freedom of expression and the freedom of the media. This 
important question relating to the right to identity is only touched upon as an aside in 
                                                 
64 Wells v Atoll Media (Pty) Ltd (unreported 11961/2006) [2009] ZAWCHC 173 (9 November 2009). 
65 See Cornelius 2008 TSAR; Cornelius 2008 ISLRP. 
66 See Allison v Vintage Sports Plaques 136 F 3d 1443. 
67 Wells v Atoll Media (Pty) Ltd (unreported 11961/2006) [2009] ZAWCHC 173 (9 November 2009). 
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the Grütter68 and Wells69 cases. In both instances the courts made it clear that the 
right to identity is not absolute, but did not discuss this issue much further. 
 
It goes without saying that the use of a person's attributes must be unlawful before a 
plaintiff will succeed with any claim in delict. In other cases where satisfaction or 
damages were claimed due to the infringement of dignitas, the courts have already 
recognised certain grounds of justification which would mean that the apparent 
violation of personality rights would indeed be lawful. 
 
Neethling70 correctly states that public policy can justify an apparent violation of the 
right to identity, but it would also make sense to consider the other grounds on which 
the infringement of dignitas can be justified. These grounds include consent,71 truth 
and public interest,72 fair comment73 and jest.74 In addition Neethling75 also indicates 





Because the South African approach is derived from a common law based on 
general principles, the law as laid down and contemplated in Grütter76 and restated 
in Wells77 is open and receptive to change, so that current developments in 
commerce can be accommodated. This approach provides broader scope for 
protection than most statutory or codified provisions dealing with the right to identity. 
On the one hand the South African law avoids discrimination based on fame or the 
lack thereof, which seems to beset Dutch law in this regard. On the other hand, it 
seems as if South African law now recognises a variety of attributes that are worthy 
                                                 
68 Grütter v Lombard 2007 4 SA 89 (SCA). 
69 Wells v Atoll Media (Pty) Ltd (unreported 11961/2006) [2009] ZAWCHC 173 (9 November 2009). 
70 Neethling Persoonlikheidsreg 315. 
71 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Deliktereg 89. 
72 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Deliktereg 313. 
73 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Deliktereg 315. 
74 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Deliktereg 317. 
75 Neethling Persoonlikheidsreg 315. 
76 Grütter v Lombard 2007 4 SA 89 (SCA). 
77 Wells v Atoll Media (Pty) Ltd (11961/2006) [2009] ZAWCHC 173 (9 November 2009). 
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of protection, in contrast to statutory or codified provisions which, by definition, can 
protect only specifically-listed attributes. 
 
The judgment in Wells78 is significant for various reasons. It is a restatement of the 
law laid down in Grütter79 and provides a judicial interpretation of the judgment in the 
latter case. In the process, Davis J has also redefined the right to identity and 
provided some clarity on what infringement of that right would amount to. 
 
It is now trite that everyone has a right to identity. For these purposes, identity 
includes the collection of specific congenital and acquired attributes which are 
unique to the individual and distinguish the individual from others. When the 
attributes of a person are used without consent, the right to identity can be violated in 
one of four ways. A person's right to identity can be infringed if the attributes of that 
person are used without permission in a way which – 
 
(a) cannot be reconciled with the true image of the individual concerned; 
(b)  amounts to commercial exploitation of the individual; 
(c) cannot be reconciled with generally accepted norms of decency; or  
(d) violates the privacy of that person. 
 
From this analysis, it would seem that our law has now reached a level of 
development which is not very different from the common law tort of invasion of 
privacy which applies in most US states. 
 
In the final analysis, though, Wells80 should not be seen as a precedent to suggest 
that the media may not display or publish a photograph depicting an individual 
subject unless that subject has consented to such display or publication. The unique 
facts of the case and the fact that Davis J repeatedly qualified his judgment with 
reference to the context of the case mean that such an interpretation would be 
exaggerated. The user can therefore still, in certain appropriate cases, justify the 
                                                 
78 Wells v Atoll Media (Pty) Ltd (11961/2006) [2009] ZAWCHC 173 (9 November 2009). 
79 Grütter v Lombard 2007 4 SA 89 (SCA). See Cornelius 2008 TSAR; Cornelius 2008 ISLRP. 
80 Wells v Atoll Media (Pty) Ltd (11961/2006) [2009] ZAWCHC 173 (9 November 2009). 
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unauthorised use of a particular person's attributes on the basis of public interest if 
such use takes place mainly in connection with public interest reporting, jest or art. 
 
What is clear though is that the law in South Africa, because of the flexibility of a 
common law approach based on general principles, probably leads the way when it 
comes to the protection of an individual against the unauthorised use of his or her 
attributes. 
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